


# DEVELOPMENT & RESILIENCE INDEX AGAINST VIOLENT EXTREMISM (DRIVE) IN NORTHERN CÔTE D'IVOIRE



# DEVELOPMENT & RESILIENCE INDEX AGAINST VIOLENT EXTREMISM (DRIVE) IN NORTHERN CÔTE D'IVOIRE

July 2024

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Cover Photo: Graphical presentation of levels of social immunity to the attractiveness and influence of violent extremist groups

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## LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Figure 1	Sample distribution	7
Figure 2	Proportion of individuals "legitimizing" VEO governance capabilities: livelihoods	10
Figure 3	Tendency to distance oneself from the State scores	11
Figure 4	Visualization of EV risk	12
Figure 5	Heatmap of Social Immunity	13
Figure 6	Conceptual model of DRIVE-CI	14
Figure 7	Predictive model results	15
Figure 8	Results from the resilience analysis	16
Figure 9	Resilience Index model	17
Figure 10	Hierarchy of local tensions	18
Figure 11	Percentages of daily stress	19
Figure 12	Correlations with the "Feeling of marginalization" indicator	20
Figure 13	Heatmap Feelings towards the FDS	21
Figure 14	Gap between attack and suspicion of VEO presence	22
Figure 15	Heatmap Authoritative values	24
Figure 16	Correlations with the "Extent of gold panning activities" indicator	25
Figure 17	Community self-help practices	26
Figure 18	Religious freedom	27
Figure 19	Correlations with the "Religious freedom" indicator	28
Figure 20	Dissatisfaction with FDS	29
Figure 21	Correlations with the indicator "Tendency to cooperate with the FDS"	30
Figure 22	Initiatives to strengthen social cohesion	31
Figure 23	Access to public services	32
Figure 24	Support for gender equality	33
Figure 25	Support initiatives for women	33
Figure 26	Future prospects	34
Figure 27	Correlations with the "Future prospects" indicator	35
Figure 28	Map of Index indicators	36
Figure 29	Graphical representation of stress and resilience levels	44

## TABLE OF CONTENT

<b>List of tables and figures</b>	<b>3</b>
<hr/>	
<b>SECTION I. WHY MEASURE RESILIENCE TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE?</b>	<b>5</b>
1. Why build a Resilience Index ?	5
2. Index methodology	5
a. What is SCORE?	5
b. How was SCORE used to build the Resilience Index?	6
c. A mixed, participatory research protocol	7
<hr/>	
<b>SECTION II. RESILIENCE TO WHAT END?</b>	<b>9</b>
1. What's the threat we're trying to avoid?	9
a. Reduce the social appeal of VEOs to reduce their ability to infiltrate communities	9
b. Strengthen attachment to the State and its institutions	11
2. Reinforcing social immunity to the appeal and influence of VEOs	13
a. Development objective: make communities immune to the risk of VE	13
b. What resilience mode does DRIVE-CI propose?	14
3. DRIVE-CI catalogs resilience to shocks and social immunity to VEOs	14
a. Predictive model results	15
b. Results from the resilience analysis	16
c. Building a checklist of resilience capabilities	16
<hr/>	
<b>SECTION III. RESILIENCE TO WHAT? WHAT ARE THE SHOCKS AND STRESSORS?</b>	<b>18</b>
1. Stress factors linked to social cohesion	18
2. Stress factors linked to vertical cohesion	21
3. Stress factors related to the security environment	22
4. Stress factors linked to ideological values: the authoritarian instinct	23
5. Stress factors linked to economic opportunities: the issue of illegal gold mining	25
<hr/>	
<b>SECTION IV. AN INVENTORY OF RESILIENCE CAPACITIES</b>	<b>26</b>
1. Resilience capacity linked to horizontal social cohesion	26
2. Resilience capacities linked to security governance	29
3. Resilience capacities linked to local governance	31
4. Resilience capacities linked to access to basic needs	32
5. Resilience capacities linked to gender inequality	33
6. Resilience capacities linked to outlook	34
<hr/>	
<b>SECTION V. WHICH LOCATIONS ARE RESILIENT?</b>	<b>36</b>
1. Mapping the current situation based on the 24 axes of the index	36
2. Local strengths and weaknesses	38
3. How do the locations compare with each other?	44
CONCLUSIONS	45
<hr/>	
<b>ANNEXES</b>	<b>45</b>

## SECTION I.

# WHY MEASURE RESILIENCE TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE?

## 1 Why build a Resilience Index?

After the 2016 attack on Grand-Bassam (a town near the Ivorian economic capital of Abidjan) a string of deadly attacks in the country's northern border zone with Burkina Faso and Mali by Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) active in the Sahel demonstrated that Côte d'Ivoire was not to be spared from violent extremism (VE). Ivorian authorities, aware of the risk of VEO expansion, invested heavily in a proactive policy to secure their Northern border. This securitized approach to the issue was complemented by the development of multifaceted initiatives to improve human security and access to basic social services, develop infrastructure, and promote social cohesion. This governmental effort sought to alleviate the sense of insecurity and socio-economic alienation likely to serve as incubators for VEO exploitation and has been supported by various initiatives led by non-state actors.

The Resilience for Peace (R4P) project implemented by Equal Access International (EAI) is part of this effort. Funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), R4P aims to build community resilience to VE in the northern border areas of Côte d'Ivoire. R4P relies on comprehensive contextual analysis of local social, political, economic, and cultural factors and dynamics to drive its activities. Since the start of the project, more than twenty studies and research projects have been carried out, providing data on a range of dynamics such as the rise of artisanal gold mining and other illicit activities in border areas, and the identification of the early and detectable warning signs of VE.

The Resilience Index pilot being referred to as DRIVE-CI serves as an operational reference matrix. It is designed as a decision-making and action-support tool, providing

evidence to inform, guide, prioritize and measure the impact of public policies and other initiatives working to prevent and counter VE. Many P/CVE projects claim to tackle a long list of diverse "risk factors" and "vulnerabilities" to VE, with no common hierarchy or linkages. While the term "resilience-building" is frequently used in these projects, there is rarely any precise formulation, documentation or definition of specific resilience capabilities. To address this, the design of DRIVE-CI drew heavily on USAID's conceptual framework for resilience and the Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index (SCORE) methodology, which resulted in a **model of community resilience to threats from VEOs**. The model addresses the question, *"Given the unstable security situation of its Sahelian neighbors (Burkina Faso and Mali), how can Côte d'Ivoire prevent or reduce the spread of VE into the north of its territory?"* We seek to identify resilience capacities that can guarantee the lowest possible social receptivity to the VEO's offer of alternative governance in border localities.

To differentiate the Resilience Index from those being used in other countries, the tool has been defined as the **Development & Resilience Index against Violence Extremism- Côte d'Ivoire (DRIVE-CI)**. It will be referenced as such throughout the remainder of this document.

Community resilience refers to the ability of a community to effectively manage stressful events, reduce risks associated with these events and prepare for future challenges by leveraging factors such as economic aspects, social capital, and community competence. Resilience is what allows communities to activate suitable resources to cope with adversities <sup>1</sup>.

## 2 Index methodology

### a What is SCORE?

SCORE was developed by the United Nations Development Program Action for Cooperation and Trust (UNDP-ACT) and the Center for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD), with funding from USAID. It is an evidence-based decision-support tool that combines an in-depth participatory research process with advanced data analysis to identify the drivers of conflict

dynamics and promote social change and peacebuilding. The SCORE Index can be adapted to different contexts on different continents.

### How was SCORE used to build the Resilience Index?

The SCORE methodology seeks to quantify the levels of a social phenomenon's manifestation, thus providing

<sup>1</sup> Olcese, 2024.

precise quantitative information on attitudes and behaviors (e.g. “civic engagement”), perceptions (e.g. “feelings of marginalization”) or opinions (e.g. “relationship with authority”). To be measured, a phenomenon is first converted into an indicator, i.e. an observable, measurable quantity. For example, using a phenomenon such as “political security” refers to several dimensions. If one is politically secure, they are to vote freely, engage in political activity, and freely choose between several political parties. Thus, the “political security” indicator aggregates multiple factors <sup>2</sup>. This combination of factors makes it possible to measure different perspectives of the same phenomenon and to establish an indicator.

### How to read a SCORE indicator

The SCORE methodology provides a standardized measure of social phenomena (scores from 0 to 10). A score of 0 corresponds to the total absence of the phenomenon at individual, regional or sample level, while a score of 10 signifies its total presence. These phenomena can then be presented in the form of heatmaps that illustrate the level of manifestation of the phenomenon in the different geographical areas studied <sup>3</sup>.

## b How was SCORE used to build the Resilience Index?

Once the indicators were statistically tested, it is possible to observe how they interact with each other. Predictive analysis and resilience analysis were carried out to build the Index. Each type of analysis provides its own insights into the dynamics surrounding the influence of VEOs in the localities observed. In this sense, they are complementary and enable us to “sort out” the phenomena that statistically contribute to structuring the resilience of communities to VE.

### Predictive analysis

Predictive analysis is initially used to determine the strength of the linear correlation between two indicators, using Pearson's correlation coefficient <sup>4</sup>. Causal analysis goes beyond the simple relationship between two variables to reveal the strength and direction of the influence that certain phenomena have on others. In this case, certain indicators (phenomena) can be described as “drivers” or “predictors”, because they positively or negatively predict the manifestation of the other phenomena to which they are linked. The arrows in the model represent the relationship, direction and strength of influence of one phenomenon on another <sup>5</sup>.

### Resilience analysis

Resilience analysis identifies the characteristics that enable individuals or communities to respond positively to stress and adapt to it. This type of analysis is notably used in development psychology <sup>6</sup> and conflict studies. It is an analytical strategy that enables researchers to test questions related to stressors and resilience factors. To test stressors, multilevel linear regression modeling is used to examine the effects of various stressors on an outcome. This enables us to understand which stressors impact the outcome of interest, and how strongly they do so. In this way, we can assess the effect of an environmental phenomenon (a community initiative linked to restrictive water management, for example) on people's individual reactions (deterioration in household food security). Once the expected impact of stressors has been identified, the analysis then focuses on those individual cases in the sample that are doing “better than expected” (those who, despite having been exposed to restrictive water management, did not experience a deterioration in their level of food security). This makes it possible to observe the specific characteristics of individuals who, despite being placed in the same stressful conditions as others, manage to adapt. These characteristics are resilience factors.

<sup>2</sup> These are Likert-type questions, i.e. closed questions to which the respondent is offered several response options (such as “strongly disagree”, “strongly disagree”, “somewhat agree”, “strongly agree”). These questions are also called items.

<sup>3</sup> The *heatmaps* presented in this report show the scores for each sub-prefecture. In addition to representing the phenomenon by locality, the scores for each of the phenomena can be disaggregated by gender, level of education, age and other categories.

<sup>4</sup> LOREM IPSUM DOLOR.

<sup>5</sup> Mediation analysis was also carried out to statistically confirm the significance of the links between the variables and the results of the model. This analysis is used to study the effect of one or more independent variables on a dependent variable via a third variable (mediator) or an intermediate variable.

<sup>6</sup> **Alexandros Lordos and Daniel Hyslop**, *The assessment of multisystemic resilience in conflict-affected populations*, in *Multisystemic Resilience: Adaptation and Transformation in Contexts of Change*, Michael Ungar, ed. (New York: Oxford Academic, 2021); **Alexandros Lordos and others**, *Societal healing in Rwanda: toward a multisystemic framework for mental health, social cohesion, and sustainable livelihoods among survivors and perpetrators of the genocide against the Tutsi*, *Health and Human Rights Journal*, vol. 23, No. 1 (June 2021).

**C A mixed, participatory research protocol**






To develop DRIVE-CI, a hybrid methodological approach was adopted, combining qualitative and quantitative surveys. R4P has completed considerable research shedding light on the local dynamics of VE in border areas. DRIVE-CI was initially based on this empirical research, and a systematic literature review was carried out to integrate existing work.

A second phase of qualitative data collection was carried out in August 2023, consisting of more than a dozen Focus Groups with women, youth and community elders in each of the localities. In addition, a series of key informant interviews were conducted. Village chiefs, sub-prefects, Dozos, health workers, representatives of the Defense and Security Forces, etc. were consulted and interviewed to gain their understanding of local dynamics linked to resilience to VE.

The quantitative phase was conducted in October 2023. A questionnaire (closed questions) was administered to 2049 respondents randomly selected throughout the target area. Prior to this, a randomization process was carried out to obtain representative results at sub-prefecture level (according to gender, age, socio-professional category, etc.).

R4P's annual learning summit in Yamoussoukro in November 2023 was an opportunity for researchers to "test their results" and present the preliminary results of the statistical analysis. DRIVE-CI was presented to a diverse audience (researchers, civil society, political de-

**Figure 1. Sample distribution**



cision-makers, security forces, etc.), who were able to provide comments and suggestions for the next stages of the analysis. Next, a participatory workshop was organized specifically for community representatives. Participants were distributed around different tables to discuss the initial results (grouped into six key messages), inviting them to share their life experiences related to the data, and to vote on which of the messages identified were most significant. Attendees then gave location-specific input based on their intimate knowledge of the localities chosen for the study.

To ensure that DRIVE-CI is useful for the government of Côte d'Ivoire, a steering committee has been created, representing State partners of R4P as well as security and defense structures, including the National Security Council (CNS) and the National Border Commission of Côte d'Ivoire

(CNFCI). As DRIVE-CI aims to inform the actions of structures and institutions working on this issue in northern Côte d'Ivoire, the project has also set up a consultation framework. Several meetings of the steering committee and the consultation framework took place during the development process (from the qualitative phase to the interpretation of the results of the statistical analysis), facilitating the collection of feedback and the needs of the various institutions and organizations involved.

The strength of DRIVE-CI is its use of sophisticated statistical techniques, calibration of research tools according to existing qualitative work and consultation with populations and communities to guarantee a **bottom-up** description of local realities. This “layered” approach facilitates the integration and standardization of the tool by local and international players.



*Analysis workshop on the results of the resilience index in Yamoussoukro in November 2023 with residents and local authorities from the departments of Folon, Tengrela and Téhini.*



## SECTION II.

## RESILIENCE - TO WHAT END?

**1 What's the threat we're trying to avoid?**

The aim of DRIVE-CI is to propose resilience measures that will enable localities in northern Côte d'Ivoire to guard against the advance of VEOs, as observed in neighboring countries. The VEO advance is seen here as an extension of the zone of influence of these groups, which have a range of modes of infiltration and actions.<sup>7</sup>

These can manifest in violence (e.g. attacks on markets, theft of livestock, hold-ups, kidnapping of wealthy traders) or more tacit forms (presence of unknown persons offering to build a mosque, massive purchases of food, massive presence of livestock at the market, etc.)<sup>8</sup>.

**a Reduce the social appeal of VEOs to reduce their ability to infiltrate communities**

The territorial expansion of these groups depends in part on the resilience of local security forces, as accessibility to some locations is in part a security challenge. Numerous studies show that the infiltration strategies used by VEOs depends on their ability to gain local acceptance<sup>9</sup>. VEOs often exploit socio-economic grievances<sup>10 11</sup>, or shortcomings in public service provision<sup>12</sup> to gain the support of local populations. These groups are effective when they are perceived as providing a viable alternative to established governing institutions.

Social acceptance can take different forms: it can be based on financial exchange practices (individuals

agreeing to run an errand for the group in exchange for money), it can be anchored in a posture of legitimization of these groups' governance capacities, or it can involve genuine cooperation synonymous with replacement of state authority (individuals choosing to turn to armed groups in the event of a crime or misdemeanor rather than contacting the FDS). **The social acceptance of VEOs is viewed here from a political perspective: it illustrates the extent to which these groups are considered by the population as actors "capable" of assuming certain sovereign functions.**

<sup>7</sup> Nsaibia H. & Weiss C. (2018), *Ansaroul Islam and the Growing Terrorist Insurgency in Burkina Faso*, CTS Sentinel, vol. 11, issue 3.

<sup>8</sup> LOREM IPSUM DOLORET.


<sup>9</sup> Le Roux (2019), *Confronting Central Mali's Extremist Threat*, Africa Center for Strategies Studies.

<sup>10</sup> Ammour (2020), *How Violent Extremist Groups Exploit Intercommunal Conflicts in the Sahel*, Africa Center for Strategies Studies.

<sup>11</sup> Ojielo O. et al. (2017), *Sur les chemins de l'extrémisme en Afrique : Moteurs, dynamiques et éléments déclencheurs*, UNDP.

<sup>12</sup> Akindès F. et al. (2023), *Analyse des dynamiques sociales et économiques pour la prévention de l'expansion des Groupes Extrémistes Violents (GEV) dans l'Espace Comoré* (Côte d'Ivoire), EAI/USAID.

**Figure 2. Proportion of individuals "legitimizing" VEO governance capabilities: livelihoods**



Although the data varies significantly according to the governance action proposed around 15% of respondents do not systematically reject armed groups. Nearly one in six respondents considers that these groups could improve the socio-economic situation of their locality.

The hypothesis is that a locality is more at risk when the population perceives these groups as alternative "authorities." The more individuals consider these groups to be able to make their life better and "replace the state," the more easily groups can integrate locally.


## b Strengthen attachment to the State and its institutions

The expansion of VEOs is also fueled by citizens' alienation from the state. On one level, state institutions and armed groups are "in competition", as the latter seek to propose an alternative political offer to that of the state. The extension of the VEO zone of influence is therefore fueled by **the erosion of moral credibility granted to state institutions**.

As numerous studies have shown, the spread of VEOs in the region is particularly marked in areas deserted

by the state, or where the state has lost its credibility as a governing authority<sup>13</sup>. Social infiltration by VEOs and trust in the state are competing and incompatible trends. A person's decision to rely on VEOs to manage their day-to-day affairs is generally motivated by a lack of confidence in existing institutions (or when these institutions are no longer present or visible in the locality). This tendency among the population to disregard the services provided by the state and to avoid using its services is indicative of a problematic detachment. It illustrates a loss

**Figure 3. Tendency to distance oneself from the State scores<sup>14</sup>**



<sup>13</sup> United Nations Development Program , 2016.

<sup>14</sup> The higher the score in a locality, the more a large number of citizens of this locality say they avoid using the type of public service concerned.


of confidence in the state and estrangement from legitimate power. In some instances, individual strategies develop to “act without it” even when state services are available. The following figure illustrates the tendency of individuals to avoid using local public services. For instance, citizens may prefer to seek medical treatment in other countries rather than in local health establishments or refuse to collect identification documents from their local administration. The higher the score represented, the more citizens distance themselves from the state, even when services are available.

The ability of armed groups to expand their influence in the region seems to require an erosion of the relationship between residents and the state combined with the belief that VEOs are socially acceptable and legitimately

able to assume the functions of the government.

VE risk is conceptualized here from a *political* perspective that serves as a disruptive factor to vertical social cohesion. **The threat that must be avoided is that of citizens distancing themselves from the state and moving closer to VEOs.** The risk of VE both weakens and feeds on the link between citizens and their state institutions. It illustrates a *continuum* and can be illustrated in three stages (see Figure 7). The first indicator provides information on an individual's tendency to avoid using the public services available in his or her locality and reflects local tendencies towards detachment from the state. A second considers VEOs as potential governing authorities. The third reflects an inclination to eventually cooperate with these groups <sup>15</sup>.

**Figure 4. Visualization of EV risk**



The threat of VE is therefore based on an individual trajectory illustrating a citizen's withdrawal from state institutions and a move towards VEOs as alternative “authorities”. **The more this behavior is shared by individuals in a locality, the more vulnerable it is to VEO infiltration** (as more individuals are predisposed

to consider them as viable alternative authorities). The goal of DRIVE-CI is to identify the conditions that should reinforce communities’ resilience against this risk. Consequently, the design intentionally focuses on the **community's resistance to the appeal and influence of VEOs** <sup>16</sup>.

<sup>15</sup> More precisely, it illustrates an individual disposition to replace state power with armed groups (here we are talking about citizens who, in the event of a situation of offence or crime, consider turning to these groups rather than to the FDS for example).

<sup>16</sup> The variable of interest is constructed from a combination of the three indicators shown in Figure 7. Like all the other indicators in the Index, it has undergone a series of statistical validations (factorial analysis and Cronbach alpha) to confirm its reliability, validity and relevance for measuring the phenomenon under stud

## 2 Reinforcing social immunity to the appeal and influence of VEOs


### a Development objective: make communities immune to the risk of VE

USAID’s conceptual approach to resilience demands a positive development objective, so DRIVE-CI focuses on the opposite of vulnerability, or the level of social immunity to VE. Social immunity illustrates a configuration where individuals feel close to the state, use public services, and reject armed groups as potential alternative governance sources, ultimately refusing to cooperate with them.

Since VEOs offer a “package” that competes with that of the state, the goal of DRIVE-CI is to identify those

elements that enable communities to collaboratively resist the influence, ideology and actions of VE. Here, social immunity reflects the general level of insensitivity to the appeal and influence of VEOs. In this sense, social immunity illustrates a local configuration of heightened “social resilience” to the influence and territorial expansion of VEOs. A community with a high level of social immunity makes it more difficult for VEOs to infiltrate the social fabric - as individuals maintain a strong link with the state and refuse to perceive armed groups as legitimate alternatives.

Figure 5. Heatmap of Social Immunity



<sup>14</sup> The higher the score in a locality, the more a large number of citizens of this locality say they avoid using the type of public service concerned..

Looking at figure 5, the two subprefectures that demonstrate the least immunity, and conversely the most vulnerability to VE influence, are Tengréla and Gogo. This represents a visualization of the various stress factors that potentially can or are weakening the social level of immunity to VE. Alone, this would indicate that conditions

are favorable in these departments for an expansion of VE influence. However, DRIVE-CI also identifies local resilience factors, i.e. the local capacities that enable some communities to adapt to contextual stress factors and protect themselves against the social influence of VEOs. This idea is expanded in sections three and four.

### b What resilience mode does DRIVE-CI propose?

DRIVE-CI proposes a framework for assessing the ability of communities to cope with, adapt to and recover from shocks (terrorist attacks) and stress factors (socio-economic consequences of population movements into the zone, increased competitive dynamics around land, marginalization, complicated relations with the FDS...) exploited by VEOs in northern Côte d'Ivoire.

The tool's development is based on three-pronged sequencing: assessment of the level of social immunity to VEO appeal and influence (see Figure 10), the stress factors that contribute to weakening this social immunity (see section 3) and, finally, the resilience capacities that enable communities to resist VE influence despite the shocks and stresses they have undergone (see section 4).

Figure 6. Conceptual model of DRIVE-CI



### 3 DRIVE-CI catalogs resilience to shocks and social immunity to VEOs

By combining the results of both types of analysis (predictive model and resilience analysis)<sup>17</sup>, it has been possible to identify the strengths and weaknesses of communities

against the spread of VEOs. DRIVE-CI enables programmatic entry points for reinforcing resilience and preventing the spread of VEO influence in northern Côte d'Ivoire.


<sup>17</sup> See methodology in introduction.

**a Predictive model results**

The model's key variable is social immunity to the appeal and influence of VEOs. The predictive model provides information on all the phenomena that “cause” immunity. In Figure 10 we show the causal links that can reinforce or reduce social immunity. The model suggests two “waves” of effects: first, there are the direct predictors

of social immunity (Feelings towards the FDS, Negotiation with VEOs, Inter-community cohabitation, Conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms, Access to health and education services), followed by indirect predictors, i.e. phenomena that “cause” the direct determinants (the indicators on the left of the figure).

**Figure 7. Predictive model results**




## b Results from the resilience analysis

The model's key variable is twofold: it measures individuals' adherence or loyalty to the state and their tendency to reject VEOs. The figure first shows the stress factors (in red). These describe the conditions, statistically identified, that erode social immunity and provide ideal conditions for the expansion of the influence of

armed groups. The phenomena in green represent resilience factors, or resources that enable resilience in the face of adversity. If two communities are simultaneously subjected to the same levels of adversity (phenomena in red), the one with the resources (in green) will be better "equipped" to resist the influence of VEOs.

**Figure 8. Results from the resilience analysis**



## c Building a checklist of resilience capabilities


Although the two analyses use different statistical techniques, they provide complementary insights into the stress factors that undermine social immunity to the influence of VEOs, and the resilience factors that

strengthen communities in the face of this threat. To facilitate understanding of both analyses, the results of each have been combined and brought together in a common visual.



Figure 9. Resilience Index model

## SOCIAL IMMUNITY TO THE ATTRACTIVENESS AND INFLUENCE OF VEO



All the indicators shown in Figure 12 were statistically identified by one of the two analyses (Figures 10 and 11). In line with the conceptual model of resilience adopted (see Figure 9), these indicators are categorized into stressors and resilience capacities. They act either as:

- **Factors that weaken social immunity.**
- **Factors that reinforce social immunity**

To facilitate interpretation and implementation of DRIVE-CI, this report should be seen as a checklist of the stress factors and resilience capabilities that compose the tool. There are twenty-four factors being measured, 10 stressors and 14 resilience capabilities. Stressors are grouped into five distinct categories (see section 3), while resilience capabilities are grouped into 6 categories (see section 4)<sup>18</sup>, to simplify and contextualize the reading of the tool.

This report is designed as a user's manual for DRIVE-CI. It is a guide to understanding the methodology and the indicators that comprise its framework.

<sup>18</sup> See appendices for the specific situation of each of the sub-prefectures visited. An individual visual display showing the score for each of the 24 indicators for each locality was produced.

SECTION III.

# RESILIENCE TO WHAT? WHAT ARE THE SHOCKS AND STRESSORS THAT NEED TO BE COUNTERED?

As illustrated in Figure 12, the ten stress factors have been identified as vulnerability factors contributing to the deterioration of social immunity to the influence and appeal of VEOs. They are grouped under five coherent,

yet multidimensional and interdependent categories linked to social cohesion: (1), relationship with existing institutions (2), security environment (3), ideological dimension (4) and economic opportunities (5).

## 1 Stress factors linked to social cohesion



*Inter-community tensions*

Localities in the north of the country experience varying types and levels of structural stress. These may stem from chieftaincy disputes, land disputes, natural resource disputes or political rivalries. Respondents were presented with a list of disputes and asked to consider the extent to which each regularly led to outbreaks of violence. The



*Sense of injustice linked to belonging to a group*

following figure shows the hierarchy of the “local danger” represented by each of these points of contention. The higher the score, the greater the number of residents who consider it to be a particular source of violence. In locations researched, the three main dangers are herder/farmer conflicts, land disputes and clashes over natural resources.

**Figure 10. Hierarchy of local tensions**

	Land disputes	Disputes related to natural resources	Tensions among farmers and herders	Political rivalries	Inter-ethnic tensions	Tensions related to chieftaindom	Tensions related to migrations	Foreign influences	VEO Threats
<b>TENGRÉLA</b>									
Débéte	4.1	2.9	4.7	2.1	1.4	1.1	1.3	1.0	0.8
Kanakono	4.4	4.2	4.6	2.0	2.0	1.5	1.8	1.4	1.4
Papara	4.3	4.2	4.2	1.3	1.6	0.8	0.9	1.4	1.2
Tengéla	5.2	4.6	5.4	2.8	2.4	1.6	1.8	1.6	1.5
<b>TÉHINI</b>									
Tougbo	2.3	2.4	3.7	0.7	0.6	0.2	1.3	0.9	0.5
Téhini	1.3	1.9	4.2	0.6	0.7	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2
Gogo	2.0	1.4	5.1	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.8	0.1
<b>MINIGNAN</b>									
Tienko	5.0	4.3	5.5	3.4	2.3	1.6	4.2	2.2	1.5
Sokoro	5.0	4.6	6.9	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0
Kimbirila Nord	1.8	1.8	4.9	1.1	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Minignan	4.3	3.7	7.0	2.0	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.2

Nearly one in two respondents feel that managing land access is a source of conflict. Land disputes and historical difficulties in resolving these problems erode confidence in state and traditional authorities. The prevalence of stressors and the existence of day-to-day disputes between communities push people to distance themselves from the state.

One hypothesis is that people tend to blame institutions for their routine stressors. When the state and its representatives are unable to arbitrate and resolve disputes, individuals may choose to turn away from the state as ineffective. This may make the proposed governance of VEOs more attractive. The tensions built up around common points of contention influence day-to-day relations between individuals and contribute to the deterioration of the social fabric.


The issue of conflict arbitration is particularly crucial, because it conditions the sense of community. The feeling of being wronged in the resolution of disputes linked to access to natural resources is an element that weakens social cohesion. In this context, perceptions of injustice due to socio-cultural belonging or lack of belonging are significant stress factors for local communities.

Numerous studies of armed groups in the Sahel highlight their narrative strategies, specifically geared towards recruiting candidates who are marginalized<sup>19</sup> and harbor grievances against state institutions. Marginalized individuals are easier prey for VEOs, as individuals who have been “abandoned” by the authorities. The resilience analysis confirms this hypothesis: the feeling of marginalization creates conditions that can facilitate VEO acceptance. In practical terms, **marginalized individuals are more likely than others to consider that VEOs could provide legitimate and effective governance.**


**Figure 11.**  
**Percentages of daily stress**

Never Rarely Often Always Don't know

**Provocations and insults between individuals from different ethnic groups**



**Fights or isolated incidents between two individuals from different ethnic groups can lead to open conflicts that end up pitting two communities against each other**




<sup>19</sup> Ozonnia Ojielo and others, *Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives, and the Tipping Point for Recruitment*, New York: UNDP, 2017 ; Harriet Allan and others, *Drivers of Violent Extremism: Hypotheses and Literature Review* London: Royal United Services Institute, 2015.

Differences in the perceived degree of marginalization were significant across departments: respondents in Tengréla were more likely than those in Téhini and Minignan to feel marginalized. No significant differences were observed when disaggregated by age, gender or level of education. This suggests that feelings of marginalization are less linked to social status than they are to exposure to a series of localized phenomena (see figure 15<sup>20</sup>).

Factors linked to a heightened sense of marginalization reinforce a well-known sociological pattern, that individual isolation stems from the shortcomings of traditional socializing institutions. These encompass: a breakdown in family structure, complex intergenerational ties, tense relations with peers, a lack of freedom of worship, and local political leaders who overlook minority concerns.

**Figure 12. Correlations with the "Feeling of marginalization" indicator**



<sup>20</sup> The items shown in the figure are the factors associated with feelings of suspicion. They have been identified using Pearson correlations, which measure the strength of the linear relationship between two variables. A correlation identifies the existence of a link between two variables: it describes the "covariance". When a correlation is confirmed, it means that the two phenomena measured are not independent. It does not imply causality, but rather an association between two phenomena.

## 2 Stress factors linked to vertical cohesion



Feelings towards FDS



Corruption in public service




Institutional distrust

Disapproval of security forces (FDS) is not exclusively related to its security-oriented approach. The predictive model demonstrates that negative attitudes towards the FDS increase when perceived corruption in various public sectors (education, justice, administrative services, etc.) increases. In other words, the image and relation-

ship between the FDS and citizens deteriorates when residents perceive the entire administrative apparatus as corrupt. To corroborate this hypothesis, the following model demonstrates that the level of trust in institutions in general is a key determinant of how the population views the FDS.

Figure 13. Heatmap feelings towards the FDS



At issue is not the presence of the FDS, but rather the interaction and perception of these authorities by residents. To some extent, the FDS are “judged” by the general functioning of the state. When people feel that certain areas of public action are corrupt (be it education, health or justice), the FDS “pay the price.”

It is also interesting to note that there is a significant correlation between confidence in the FDS and competition for natural resources. This means that when competition for water, gold, agricultural and pastoral land is intensified, there is a measurable deterioration in trust of the FDS. The FDS are key players in the management of natural resources, embodying the authority

responsible for enforcing restrictions on activities, making them essential partners for negotiation or repression. This trend confirms the hypothesis that populations' perception of the FDS is

tied to the application of the right to security, as well as to other issues external to physical security.

### 3 Stress factors related to the security environment



Exposure to the threat of violent extremism



Restriction of movement




Sense of insecurity

Exposure to attacks is a shock that weakens communities and encourages the expansion of VEO influence. The predictive model (see figure 10) shows that the more individuals are exposed to attacks, the more likely they are to negotiate with VEOs, and the deeper VEOs infiltrate. To a certain extent, the model provides information on the effectiveness of these groups' strategy: they attack populations and coerce individuals' daily lives until they obtain a form of fearful collaboration.

Since the Kafolo attacks in 2020, other localities have experienced violent attacks by armed groups as well. These attacks are shocks that weaken communities and give rise to widespread feelings of suspicion. **There is an interesting discrepancy between the fear of being attacked and the actual experience of VE violence: the most suspicious localities are not those most at risk.** Figure 14 shows that the two localities least exposed to attack are most likely to suspect the VE presence.

Figure 14. Gap between attack and suspicion of VEO presence



Beyond the question of suspected presence, the analyses highlight several indicators linked to physical security. They identify links between restricted mobility, dissatisfaction with the FDS, lack of cooperation with security actors and exposure to attacks. These indicators generally illustrate a dissatisfaction with the security treatment engendered by VE dynamics. When respondents felt that their mobility was restricted and that they are not completely secure, there is a resultant weakening of social immunity. When individuals restrict their movements for security reasons (avoiding going to the market, not crossing the border, reducing travel to visit relatives), they question the quality of security provided by the FDS and may consider negotiating with VEOs.

**Attacks and rumors of attacks by armed groups** instill a climate of insecurity, restrict freedom of movement and **may drive people to accept and negotiate with these groups**. The possibility of attacks fuels a **general feeling of mistrust and fear** among already vulnerable populations. This can lead to the stigmatization of other groups and fray inter-group relations.

Personal safety is crucial for local populations. When security is judged to be insufficient, the locality is more likely to socially accept VEOs. **Respect for the right to security is an essential condition for people's well-being and satisfaction. When the guarantor of this right, the state, is perceived as failing, individuals are more likely to seek an alternative authority capable of enforcing it.** This nexus of indicators linked to security affects people's relationship with the FDS, as the actor charged with protecting the sovereignty of the country.

## 4 Stress factors linked to ideological values: the authoritarian instinct



### *Legitimization of authoritarianism*


The “authoritarian values” indicator at the heart of DRIVE-CI resonates with the regional politico-security context and can be considered a trend indicator. It describes a sensitivity to the militaristic dimension of power, highlighting a tendency among some to think that democratic principles can be suspended in the interest of solving urgent and essential problems. In this sense, this indicator can be seen as a potential symptom of the dynamics observed in neighboring countries, where the expansion of VEOs in the Sahel generated a second shockwave in the political-institutional space, leading to undemocratic and unconstitutional seizures of power by the military in multiple countries.

One finding stands out: women are significantly more likely than men to support authoritarian narratives and

the use of militaristic methods. A contextual interpretation of this phenomenon is that women are often charged with the satisfaction of essential household needs (going to the market, preparing meals, etc.) and are more exposed to insecurity in a zone. Authoritarian narratives, offering simplistic solutions may appeal to them spontaneously. Authoritarian discourses may find more receptive ground when the satisfaction of basic needs is in jeopardy.

The presence of “authoritarian values” as a stress factor provides information about **the threat these groups pose to institutional stability and their ability to undermine democratic sentiment**. Dissatisfaction with the way the authorities handle security issues can be accompanied by a surge or reinforcement of authoritarian values.

**Figure 15. Heatmap Authoritative values**



## 5 Stress factors linked to economic opportunities: the issue of illegal gold mining




*Prevalence of illegal gold mining*

The practice of artisanal (illicit) gold mining reinforces the conflictual relationship between individuals and the state. Mismanagement by the state can contribute to local vulnerability to VEOs, reinforcing critical attitudes towards institutions and authorities. The figure below illustrates the dynamics mainly associated with illicit gold mining. These phenomena can be grouped into three categories: relations with FDS, economic arrangements, and intergroup relations.

Illicit gold mining is generally accompanied by a critical stance towards the FDS – as the FDS is entrusted with enforcing the law and can punish or sanction miners. This criticism is generally directed exclusively at the FDS, not at central or local authorities in charge of regulating these activities. The FDS are on the “front line” and “pay the price” because of their visibility.



**Figure 16. Correlations with the "Extent of gold panning activities" indicator**



Artisanal gold mining also influences social interactions, since outsiders are often engaged at multiple levels in the mining, processing, transporting, and trading of gold. The financial stakes are high- residents turn to mining as a viable means of securing an income. The

negative correlation with land ownership reinforces the hypothesis that it is individuals without access to land who represent the largest group of illicit miners. In a bleak economic environment, artisanal gold mining, even if illegal in most cases, offers an alternative opportunity.

SECTION IV.

# AN INVENTORY OF RESILIENCE CAPACITIES

The stresses discussed lower the social immunity of communities to VEO influence. Despite exposure to these disruptions, however, a series of capacities enable localities to preserve and strengthen their immunity. These capabilities are known as resilience, because they enable communities to cope with contextual stressors

without becoming more vulnerable to the influence and appeal of VEOs. These capacities, as shown in figure 9, fall into different dimensions: community social capital, local security governance, inclusive political ownership of local disputes, access to essential public services, gender equality issues, and local economic development.

## 1 Resilience capacity linked to horizontal social cohesion



*Intergenerational cohesion*



*Peaceful management of community diversity*



*Inter-community solidarity*



*Freedom of worship*

The extent of the influence of armed groups is largely dependent upon the quality of intra- and inter-group relations. When intergenerational relations are peaceful, and different social groups coexist peacefully, the appeal of VEOs is effectively neutralized.

The quality of intergenerational relations is essential to maintaining social cohesion. In the localities studied, relations between generations are generally harmonious: young people seek advice from their elders, there is a relationship of respect, and the two generations inter-

act and cooperate. Nevertheless, conflictual issues can arise, particularly when it comes to economic opportunities. The results show that these types of tensions are highly localized.

The issue of intergroup dynamics is also crucial. Peaceful cohabitation is defined as proactive engagement in interactions between different groups. This refers to localities where individuals from different groups interact, where there is a genuine social mix and where local practices of mutual aid and solidarity are implemented.

**Figure 17. Community self-help practices**

Often Always

### INTERGROUP SELF-HELP

Even if they don't belong to the same ethnic group, people help each other out if one of them needs money or help with a job, for example. **38%** **36%**

Even if they don't belong to the same ethnic group, people console each other when misfortune befalls them. **34%** **49%**

We criticize people who help members of an ethnic group other than their own. **8%** **4%**

### PEACEFUL MANAGEMENT OF SOCIAL DIVERSITY

Avoiding sensitive subjects. **29%** **31%**


In my locality, we often use joking or other types of wedding rings. **31%** **49%**

In my community, we use derision as a means of overcoming our tensions and disputes. **33%** **40%**

This reflects a positive peace configuration manifesting cooperation and intercultural dialogue. Effective mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the promotion of inclusive management of local affairs are essential for preserving and strengthening social capital at community level (see dimension 3).

Freedom of worship, where individuals to practice their faith without constraint, is a resilience factor against VE. Individuals with religious freedom are less likely to be attracted to extremist groups.

**Figure 18. Religious freedom**




The positive correlation between religious freedom and other dimensions of human security, such as economic, political and food security, confirms the multidimensional character of human security. This interdependence

underscores the need for an integrated approach to promoting well-being and security. The correlation between religious security, inter-community cohabitation and acceptance of conflict resolution methods underlines the

mutual dependence between respect for religious practices and social cohesion. Enhanced religious freedom fosters a social environment where living together is encouraged. By recognizing this interconnection, efforts to promote religious freedom can strengthen social cohesion and prevent intercommunity tensions.

The negative correlation between religious freedom, feelings of marginalization and post-traumatic stress disorders suggests that practicing religion offers a sense of stability and belonging, a framework of values that promote resilience and social cohesion, thereby contributing to the psychological well-being of individuals.

**Figure 19. Correlations with the "Religious freedom" indicator**



## 2 Resilience capacities linked to security governance



Reliance on FDS



Quality of public security services




Community participation in security measures

The resilience analysis identifies the presence of FDS as a resilience factor. This implies that when an individual is subjected to a range of stress factors, the presence of the FDS reassures them. However, the mere presence of the FDS is not a guarantee of satisfac-

tion. The interaction between the FDS and citizens is where sources of resilience emerge. Strengthening community resilience depends above all on a positive relationship between citizens and FDS, and on ongoing interactions between them.

Figure 20. Dissatisfaction with FDS



The table above illustrates why citizens are dissatisfied with the FDS. However, **there is no correlation between grievances against the FDS and avoiding cooperation with them.** Lack of cooperation is not due to dissatisfaction; two other dimensions play a role.

A first set of indicators measures community predispositions towards local security. These include vigilance com-

mittees, local security arrangements such as night patrols or warning systems, and cooperation with the Dozos (traditional hunting association that often provides security). This community-inspired local security configuration encourages individual cooperation with the FDS.

A second set of indicators examines economic development. Cooperation with the FDS increases when satisfac-

tion with public services increases, and when initiatives are in place to strengthen local economic development (literacy courses, microfinance systems, integration support programs). **Cooperation with the FDS increases**

**when local communities and authorities support local economic development** (public services and local development initiatives).

**Figure 21. Correlations with the indicator "Tendency to cooperate with the FDS"**



### 3 Resilience capacities linked to local governance



*Impartial and inclusive local governance*



*Endogenous conflict management frameworks*



*Mécanismes locaux de gestion des ressources naturelles*

Social cohesion is a dynamic system, subject to internal and external influences that can strengthen or weaken it. The results confirm that certain local and community initiatives contribute to strengthening social cohesion and reducing the area's vulnerability to the influence of VEOs.

Specifically, they underline the relationship between these initiatives and inter-group coexistence. This creates a ripple effect: conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms encourage people to live together peacefully, which in turn makes the mechanisms increasingly effective.

**Figure 22. Initiatives to strengthen social cohesion**

#### CURRENT INITIATIVES TO STRENGTHEN SOCIAL TIES WHICH EXIST AND WORK

Awareness-raising campaigns on violent extremism	24%	
Intercommunity dialogue	39%	
Cultural events to bring different communities together	39%	
Helping each other in the fields	50%	
Organizing sports activities for all communities	41%	
Organization of joint workshops (vegetable gardens, culinary activities, etc.)	26%	

#### CURRENT CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISMS WHICH EXIST AND WORK

Palaver tree (village conflict resolution mechanisms)	39%	
Intercommunity dialogues and committees	32%	
Community dialogue committees	26%	
Conciliation sessions with traditional authorities	24%	
Endogenous problem-solving mechanisms	17%	

The introduction of inclusive local governance arrangements and an emphasis on social acceptance in dispute resolution helps ease relations between groups and promote peaceful coexistence between communities. The integration of minority concerns and efforts to ensure that proposed solutions are responsive to conditions facilitate improved social cohesion. Many

studies have focused on the dynamics of competition for access to land and natural resources. **These results confirm that efficient management mechanisms for natural resources are critical for social cohesion.** Preventing and peacefully resolving conflicts increases social capital and strengthens communities' immunity to the influence of VEOs.

## 4 Resilience capacities linked to access to basic needs



Quality of public health and education services




Quality of public services providing identity and property registration

The availability and efficient provision of essential public services is a protective factor - the more accessible public services are, the less vulnerable the locality is to the influence of VEOs. It is not simply the presence of ser-

vices that impact the indicator, but the quality-of-service delivery. When residents have essential services available and the providers are efficacious, it serves as a vaccination against VEO influence.

**Figure 23. Access to public services**



Three administrative services in particular act as resilience factors: access to health services, education services and administrative services. The more satisfied citizens are with the provision of these types of services, the less likely they are to consider armed groups as credible alternatives.

The provision of services that people value keeps them connected to the state and reduces their need to fulfil

their needs in alternative ways (by crossing the border, for example). The results also demonstrate a strong negative correlation between distancing from the state and cooperation with the FDS. **Citizens who are unhappy with public services are often reluctant to cooperate with the FDS** - a potentially debilitating behavior, given that the prevention of the spread of VEOs relies on collaboration between local populations and security actors.



## 5 Resilience capacities linked to gender inequality




*Social acceptance of women leadership (at high level)*


Support for gender equality is a key element in countering VE, as it strengthens both individual and community resilience. Promoting gender equality can

strengthen social cohesion and dismantle extremist ideologies based on discrimination and the oppression of women.

**Figure 24. Support for gender equality**



**Figure 25. Support initiatives for women**



Gender inequality contributes to the exclusion and marginalization of women and girls from society. Promoting gender equality plays a cross-cutting role in preventing certain shocks and strengthening resilience capacities. A more

egalitarian society is less conducive to VE, as it strengthens the social acceptability of dispute resolution, reduces marginalization and offers opportunities to all.

## 6 Resilience capacities linked to outlook




*Optimism about the future*

A sense of optimism about the future is a bulwark against the influence of VEOs, strengthening individual

resilience, promoting resistance to indoctrination, and reinforcing the social fabric of communities.


**Figure 26. Future prospects**



An optimistic outlook strengthens individual resilience, as people with a positive perspective are more willing to face difficulties and challenges constructively. As a result, they are less attracted by extremist rhetoric that exploit feelings of frustration, despair and injustice. As seen in figure 30, there is a high degree of inter-dependence between an individual's sense of prospects and the reinforcement of the social fabric. Optimism and the promotion of gender equality values are linked. Optimistic individuals are more inclined to collaborate with

other members of their community, have better relations with other generations and with members of other social groups (ethnic, political, religious) groups. In addition, improvements in the functioning of the community's socio-political life (inclusive governance and local actions to strengthen social cohesion) are also linked to a tendency to approach the future positively. Ensuring that citizens have confidence in prospects has an impact on individual resilience, positively influences the social fabric and contributes to social cohesion.

**Figure 27. Correlations with the "Future prospects" indicator**



SECTION V.

# WHICH LOCATIONS ARE RESILIENT?

## 1 Mapping the current situation based on the 24 axes of the index

Figure 28. Map of Index indicators

	TOT.	TENGRÉLA				MINIGNAN				TÉHINI		
		Debété	Kanakono	Papara	Tengréla	Kirbirilia Nord	Minignan	Sokoro	Tienko	Téhini	Gogo	Tougbo
<b>Social cohesion/ Social capital</b>												
Inter-community tensions	2.0	1.8	2.5	2.6	3.0	1.2	1.8	1.1	2.0	1.0	0.7	1.0
Intergenerational cohesion	8.1	8.5	8.0	7.7	8.1	7.7	8.0	8.4	7.6	8.3	8.3	8.0
Peaceful management of community diversity	6.9	7.6	7.7	7.8	7.3	6.1	7.3	7.0	6.0	6.0	5.5	6.3
Inter-community solidarity	7.8	8.2	8.0	7.9	7.6	7.5	8.3	8.2	7.0	7.8	7.8	8.2
Freedom of worship	9.1	9.5	9.4	9.3	9.4	9.0	8.8	8.9	8.4	8.8	9.4	9.1
Sense of injustice linked to belonging to a group	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1
<b>Vertical cohesion</b>												
<b>Gouvernance sécuritaire</b>												
Reliance on FDS	5.9	5.8	5.3	5.4	6.1	6.8	7.3	5.4	6.6	5.4	3.3	6.5
Quality of public security services	6.8	7.4	6.0	5.7	7.0	7.9	7.2	4.3	7.2	7.6	5.1	8.0
Community participation in security measures	4.8	5.2	4.9	4.6	4.9	6.0	4.5	4.3	6.9	4.1	3.3	4.4
Feelings towards FDS	2.0	2.0	2.3	2.6	3.1	2.0	0.9	0.9	1.9	1.1	1.1	1.2
<b>Security environment</b>												
Corruption in public service	4.5	3.4	4.1	4.5	5.3	3.1	5.1	5.6	3.4	4.3	3.5	4.3
Institutional distrust	2.0	1.7	1.8	1.4	2.4	0.9	2.2	1.6	1.4	1.9	1.8	1.8
<b>Local governance</b>												
Impartial and inclusive local governance	7.8	8.2	8.1	7.7	7.7	7.7	7.4	7.4	6.9	8.0	8.2	8.2
Endogenous conflict management frameworks	6.0	6.2	5.5	5.7	5.7	5.9	6.7	6.3	5.4	6.7	6.4	6.6
Local mechanisms for natural resource management	3.4	4.0	3.4	3.5	3.7	5.0	2.7	2.7	4.8	2.5	2.9	2.8
<b>Access to basic social services</b>												
Quality of public health and education services	6.2	7.9	6.9	6.3	6.2	4.3	6.5	7.3	5.1	6.4	4.9	6.4
Quality of public services providing identity and property registration	5.4	5.9	5.2	4.4	5.8	5.2	5.9	4.5	7.5	5.1	3.9	4.7
<b>Ideological Values and Psychological State</b>												
Social acceptance of women leadership (at high level)	8.2	8.0	8.7	8.8	7.7	8.1	8.7	8.6	7.1	8.8	8.2	8.3
Optimism about the future	8.1	8.0	8.3	8.4	7.7	8.2	8.5	8.0	7.8	8.4	8.4	8.1
Legitimization of authoritarianism	4.9	5.0	4.2	5.0	5.0	5.3	4.5	4.0	5.1	5.0	5.6	5.4
<b>Economic opportunities</b>												
Prevalence of illegal gold mining	5.8	4.2	7.8	8.2	7.7	2.2	1.3	1.9	3.5	5.8	3.4	6.4
<b>Economic environment</b>												
Exposure to the threat of violent extremism	0.7	0.5	0.7	0.5	1.1	0.1	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.7	0.3	0.7
Restriction of movement	2.6	2.3	2.2	1.9	2.5	2.5	0.8	0.2	3.5	3.6	2.7	4.5
Sense of insecurity	2.6	2.2	2.9	2.9	2.9	1.7	2.0	1.7	1.7	2.3	2.8	2.5

## How to read the table

The table above provides an overview of the statistically identified dynamics affecting or reinforcing the social immunity of communities. This overview can be used to filter out key factors that predict local fragility. These factors are linked to the socio-economic dynamics generated by the presence of VEOs on the border. They enable the identification of territorial disparities and local strengths and weaknesses (the dynamics that make Tengréla vulnerable are different from those that make Tienko fragile, for example) <sup>21</sup>.

To facilitate reading and provide a rapid description of local contexts, the chart has been intuitively color-coded. Indicators in green illustrate resilience capacities, while those in orange illustrate stress factors. Scores highlighted in green indicate a higher-than-average local score (for the associated resilience capacity). Scores highlighted in orange indicate above-average stress. Locations with many green cells demonstrate above-average resilience capacities. Locations with orange scores are more exposed to stressors than others.



*Presentation of a sketch on living together, during a socio-cultural activity in Konela, in the sub-prefecture of Kimbirila-Nord (Folon).*


<sup>21</sup> See also the appendix for specific visuals developed for each of the sub-prefectures studied.

## 2 Local strengths and weaknesses

### TENGRÉLA DEPARTMENT

- The department of Tengréla is the most vulnerable to the influence of VEOs. This is where research indicates individuals are most likely to distance themselves from the State and potentially open doors to VEOs.
- Most of the department's subprefectures are highly exposed to the shocks and stresses identified.
- However, resilience mechanisms function better in this department than others (except conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms, which

are weaker). In this department, shocks and resilience capacities “cancel each other out”. In other words, it is thanks to the relative effectiveness of certain resilience mechanisms in Tengréla that the situation remains “under control”, despite the many difficulties facing the population. Acting on these local vulnerabilities would make the department more immune, as there are already pre-existing positive signs of resilience on which to build.



### DÉBÉTÉ'S PARADOXICAL SITUATION

The Débété subprefecture seems to be the most immune, as its resilience factors are functional, and it is less exposed to the vulnerability dynamics than the other three subprefectures. Strikingly, the VEOs' level of legitimacy is the highest in the localities surveyed, even though they are not exposed to the usual stressors that reinforce the legitimacy of these groups. Débété's situation is paradoxical in relation to the general results of the analysis.

For example, while citizens here legitimize VEOs, they do not disengage from the state and continue to trust public institutions and services. It is therefore necessary to identify - qualitatively - the specific local features of Débété, as the explanatory factors revealed by the statistical analyses do not explain why individuals in Débété legitimize VEOs more than in other localities.

### EXPLAINING THE FRAGILITY OF THE KANAKONO AND PAPARA SUBPREFECTURES





The subprefectures of Kanakono and Papara exhibit relatively similar levels of exposure to the threat of VEO. These two localities also seem to be affected by homogeneous trends in terms of social cohesion: inter-community tensions are higher than elsewhere, there is gold-

mining, there are unresolved disputes between groups and there are significant levels of marginalization. On the other hand, the dynamics linked to physical security make it possible to distinguish these two localities, since the populations of Kanakono cooperate less willingly with the FDS and claim to be less secure than those of Papara. Finally, it seems the mechanisms for preserving social capital are weak in both localities.

### TENGRÉLA'S CRITICAL SITUATION

Of the twelve subprefectures studied, Tengréla appears to be the one with the most difficulty. Respondents in this locality are more likely than elsewhere to alienate themselves from the State and legitimize VEOs. Nearly all the shocks and stresses reflecting “vulnerability” dynamics

are high in this locality. Levels of physical security, relations with governance institutions and inter-group tensions are particularly alarming. As in the Kanakono and Papara subprefectures, conflict resolution mechanisms appear to be weaker than elsewhere. These deficits hamper the locality's ability to cope with adversity and maintain a strong level of social cohesion.



## MINIGNAN DEPARTMENT

Minignan is the least exposed of the three departments to the vulnerability dynamic yet two subprefectures (Kimbirila-Nord and Tienko) exhibit weak resilience factors. Strengthening these factors could contribute to the long-term resilience of this department, which would then

be able to combine low vulnerability dynamics with functional resilience factors.



### IMPROVING GOVERNANCE RELATIONS IN MINIGNAN AND SOKORO

Improving the situation in Minignan and Sokoro would require the implementation of actions that facilitate interaction between the local population and its institutions. Respondents in both areas are more likely than elsewhere to consider various administrative sectors as corrupt, to

have less confidence in institutions and to be reluctant to cooperate with the FDS. Local governance mechanisms need to be strengthened in both subprefectures. Natural resource management mechanisms need improvement (especially in Sokoro, where tensions over land and natural resources are particularly high). Strengthening inclusive local governance practices could also improve their ability to cope with the threat of VEOs.

### SOCIAL COHESION AND ACCESS TO SERVICES IN KIMBIRILA-NORD

The localities of Kimbirila-Nord enjoy relative stability but could easily be undermined. The subprefecture is not subject to the shocks and stresses encountered elsewhere yet demonstrates weak resilience factors. This

would suggest that its stability is because it has not yet experienced any disruptive trends. Were these to materialize, the locality would be at risk, having few resilience measures at its disposal. Strengthening Kimbirila-Nord's resilience must be based on improving levels of social cohesion (intergenerational relations and inter-community cohabitation), and improved access to public services.

### THE SOCIAL COHESION AND LEGITIMIZATION OF VEOs IN TIENKO


The subprefecture of Tienko is similar in some respects to Débété, in that VEO legitimacy levels are high, yet the population shows no signs of alienation from the state. On the other hand, unlike Débété, Tienko's resilience is considerably lower. As in Kimbirila-Nord, inter-group tensions in the locality are a major problem. This dynamic is more alarming as the mechanisms and systems for pre-

serving social capital and resolving conflicts are considered inadequate. In this case, Tienko is faced with problematic inter-group relations compounded by ineffective local conflict resolution mechanisms.


Finally, religious insecurity also poses a problem in the Tienko subprefecture.

Enfin l'insécurité religieuse constitue également une lacune dans la sous-préfecture de Tienko.





## TÉHINI DEPARTMENT



The department of Tehini is like Minignan. Community fragility in both departments is primarily caused by a lack of resilience, rather than high exposure to shocks and stresses. The situation in these localities is stable now, provided no significant challenges arise. However,

if such issues were to arise, the Tehini department would be especially vulnerable and less capable of resisting the influence of VEOs.

### STRENGTHENING COLLABORATION WITH FDS IN GOGO

Among the three subprefectures studied in the department, Gogo seems to exhibit the most signs of fragility. Here, people avoid using government services more than

anywhere else. Relations with the various governance institutions are particularly dysfunctional. Respondents were least satisfied with public services in this locality. Collaboration with the FDS also seems to be most strained in Gogo.




### IMPROVING NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS THROUGHOUT THE DEPARTMENT

Every subprefecture in the department reports inadequate natural resource management systems. Moreover, inter-group communication is less frequent than elsewhere, and it would appear that communities are less likely to adopt local traditions such as a joking relationship<sup>22</sup>. This

suggests that, although there are no signs of inter-group tensions to date, the localities in the department could be vulnerable in the short term, as they have no means of preserving their social capital in the event of tensions erupting.

Finally, it seems that respondents in the department are more likely than elsewhere to support authoritarian narratives and accept a militaristic form of government.

<sup>22</sup> A joking relationship is a relationship between two people in which one is allowed by custom, and in some cases obliged, to tease or make fun of the other; the other, on the other hand, must not take offense. It is sometimes referred to as a kinship relationship.




### 3 How do the locations compare with each other?

This methodology has enabled the development of a calculation technique that provides an overall average level of stress and resilience for each location. These are not scores (as the technique used is not strictly aligned with that presented in the introduction), but an index of the average levels of stress and resilience. Adopting this approach suggests intuitive results that facilitate comparison between locations (each of which has a unique measure for stress factors and a unique measure for resilience capacities).

As a result, a graphical visualization model featuring a horizontal axis showing stress levels and a vertical axis showing resilience levels proved effective. The axes represent the average levels observed across all subprefectures. Subprefectures are then arranged on the graph according to their respective scores. For example, when a location is placed in the lower part of the graph, this means that its level of resilience is below the overall average.

**Figure 29. Graphical representation of stress and resilience levels**



This representation enables viewers to identify the specific circumstances in each locality according to their average exposure to stress factors and their average resilience capacity. For instance, the Papara subprefecture is the most problematic, as it lies on the edge of the red zone (bottom right-hand box

indicating above-average stress combined with below-average resilience).

In contrast, Minignan and Débété are the most distant localities from the critical zone. The communes of Tienko, Téhini, Tougbo

and Kanakono revolve around this zone and remain particularly vulnerable. For example, if the Tienko subprefecture were to become more exposed to stress factors in the future, the point could shift to the right on the graph, placing the subprefecture in the red zone. In a similar vein, if Tougbo's resilience capacities were to decline slightly, its position on the graph could move downwards, placing it in the red zone.

Finally, the two localities demonstrating the lowest scores in terms of social immunity, Tengréla and Gogo, are on separate sides of the graph. This means that their vulnerability

is caused by different dynamics. Gogo is at the bottom of the graph because it is particularly weak in terms of resilience capacity and therefore not well prepared for a VEO advance, while Tengréla is on the right-hand side of the graph because it is more exposed to stress factors than the others. This means that the situation could become particularly problematic in both localities if, for example, Gogo were suddenly exposed to stress factors (since it has little or no resilience capacity) or if resilience capacity were to decrease in Tengréla (the locality would then no longer be able to rely on this capacity to cope with the stresses it faces).

## CONCLUSION

The Development & Resilience Index against Violence Extremism- Côte d'Ivoire (DRIVE-CI) represents a significant step forward in data-driven efforts to counter the spread of VE. By promoting a clear, shared vision of the idea and substance of resilience against VEOs, and basing its diagnosis on sophisticated statistical techniques, DRIVE-CI provides political decision-makers and national and international stakeholders with robust evidence to guide the implementation of policies across sectors. This makes DRIVE-CI an essential tool in the governance of initiatives focused on preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). For communities, the results can be translated into qualitative, localized information, facilitating grassroots initiatives and enabling local actors to take informed action.

Furthermore, DRIVE-CI's database can facilitate dialogue from micro to macro levels with stakeholders who wish to improve their understanding of local resilience. DRIVE-

CI also offers opportunities for in-depth data mining and triangulation with other data sets. The ability to collect current data on demand, as demonstrated by the recent request from the National Security Council for rapid data collection in the Tengréla department, highlights DRIVE-CI's responsiveness and practical usefulness (July 2024).

DRIVE-CI is not limited geographically, and the development of a consortium of partners could increase the geographical scope of the tool, enabling it to be extended in Côte d'Ivoire and to neighboring countries facing similar threats.

Beyond this, DRIVE-CI has the potential to evaluate the impact of public and private P/CVE programs, thereby informing and improving future initiatives. Through these avenues, DRIVE-CI positions itself as a dynamic tool for continuous learning and contextualized adaptation against the threats of VE.



## ANNEXES

### HOW TO READ THE VISUAL :

The score at the heart of the image illustrates the level of social immunity to the attractiveness and influence of VEOs. A numerical indication (in red) provides information on the number of above-average stress factors for which the locality in question

(here, the sub-prefecture of Tengréla registers an above-average score for 9 stress factors (out of 10 in total)). Another numerical indication (in blue) shows the number of above-average resilience capacities (scores for 8 resilience capacities (out of 14) are above average in Tengréla). Finally, the visual indicates the types of stressors and above-average resilience capacities.

## HOW TO READ THE DIAGRAMS




- 1 Inter-community tensions
- 2 Sense of injustice linked to belonging to a group
- 3 Feelings towards FDS
- 4 Corruption in public service
- 5 Institutional distrust
- 6 Exposure to the threat of violent extremism
- 7 Restriction of movement
- 8 Sense of insecurity
- 9 Legitimization of authoritarianism
- 10 Prevalence of illegal gold panning

- 1 Intergenerational cohesion
- 2 Peaceful management of community diversity
- 3 Inter-community solidarity
- 4 Freedom of worship
- 5 Reliance on FDS
- 6 Quality of public security services
- 7 Community participation in security measures
- 8 Impartial and inclusive local governance
- 9 Endogenous conflict management frameworks
- 10 Local natural resource management mechanisms
- 11 Quality of public health and education services
- 12 Quality of public services providing identity and property registration
- 13 Social acceptance of women leadership (at high level)
- 14 Optimism about the future


## SOCIAL IMMUNITY TO THE ATTRACTIVENESS AND INFLUENCE OF VEO

### TENGRÉLA DEPARTMENT


Débété



Kanakono



Papara




Tengréla




### MINIGNAN DEPARTMENT


Kimbirila-Nord




Minignan



Sokoro




Tienko



TÉHINI DEPARTMENT


Téhini



Gogo




Tougbo







### RANKING OF SUB-PREFECTURES BASED ON SOCIAL IMMUNITY LEVEL



### RANKING OF SUB-PREFECTURES BASED ON STRESSORS






### RANKING OF SUB-PREFECTURES BASED ON RESILIENCE CAPACITIES



- Percentage of stressors above average
- Percentage of resilience capacities above average

### AVERAGE VALUES OF STRESSORS AND RESILIENCE CAPACITY





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
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



# CLASSIFICATION DES SOUS-PRÉFECTURES EN FONCTION DE L'IMMUNITÉ SOCIALE

SOUS-PRÉFECTURES



Niveau d'immunité sociale à l'extrémisme violent  
6 6,2 6,4 6,6 6,8

CODE DE COULEURS



11/14 CAPACITÉS DE



9/14 CAPACITÉS DE



7/14 CAPACITÉS DE RÉSILIENCE







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